Thursday, January 8, 2009

Survey: Higher Education - The Economist

The brains business
Sep 8th 2005From The Economist print edition

Mass higher education is forcing universities to become more diverse, more global and much more competitive, says Adrian Wooldridge




FOR those of a certain age and educational background, it is hard to think of higher education without thinking of ancient institutions. Some universities are of a venerable age—the University of Bologna was founded in 1088, the University of Oxford in 1096—and many of them have a strong sense of tradition. The truly old ones make the most of their pedigrees, and those of a more recent vintage work hard to create an aura of antiquity.


And yet these tradition-loving (or -creating) institutions are currently enduring a thunderstorm of changes so fundamental that some say the very idea of the university is being challenged. Universities are experimenting with new ways of funding (most notably through student fees), forging partnerships with private companies and engaging in mergers and acquisitions. Such changes are tugging at the ivy's roots.

This is happening for four reasons. The first is the democratisation of higher education—“massification”, in the language of the educational profession. In the rich world, massification has been going on for some time. The proportion of adults with higher educational qualifications in the OECD countries almost doubled between 1975 and 2000, from 22% to 41%. But most of the rich countries are still struggling to digest this huge growth in numbers. And now massification is spreading to the developing world. China doubled its student population in the late 1990s, and India is trying to follow suit.


The second reason is the rise of the knowledge economy. The world is in the grips of a “soft revolution” in which knowledge is replacing physical resources as the main driver of economic growth. The OECD calculates that between 1985 and 1997 the contribution of knowledge-based industries to total value added increased from 51% to 59% in Germany and from 45% to 51% in Britain. The best companies are now devoting at least a third of their investment to knowledge-intensive intangibles such as R&D, licensing and marketing. Universities are among the most important engines of the knowledge economy. Not only do they produce the brain workers who man it, they also provide much of its backbone, from laboratories to libraries to computer networks.


The third factor is globalisation. The death of distance is transforming academia just as radically as it is transforming business. The number of people from OECD countries studying abroad has doubled over the past 20 years, to 1.9m; universities are opening campuses all around the world; and a growing number of countries are trying to turn higher education into an export industry.


The fourth is competition. Traditional universities are being forced to compete for students and research grants, and private companies are trying to break into a sector which they regard as “the new health care”. The World Bank calculates that global spending on higher education amounts to $300 billion a year, or 1% of global economic output. There are more than 80m students worldwide, and 3.5m people are employed to teach them or look after them.


Enemies of promise


All this sounds as though a golden age for universities has arrived. But inside academia, particularly in Europe, it does not feel like it. Academics complain about “the decline of the donnish dominion” (the title of a book by A.H. Halsey, a sociologist), and administrators are locked in bad-tempered exchanges with the politicians who fund them. What has gone wrong?
The biggest problem is the role of the state. If more and more governments are embracing massification, few of them are willing to draw the appropriate conclusion from their enthusiasm: that they should either provide the requisite funds (as the Scandinavian countries do) or allow universities to charge realistic fees. Many governments have tried to square the circle through tighter management, but management cannot make up for lack of resources.


So in all too much of the academic world, the writer Kingsley Amis's famous dictum that more means worse is coming to pass. Academic salaries are declining when measured against similar jobs elsewhere, and buildings and libraries are deteriorating. In mega-institutions such as the University of Rome (180,000 students), the National University of Mexico (200,000-plus), and Turkey's Anadolu University (530,000), individual attention to students is bound to take a back seat.


The innate conservatism of the academic profession does not help. The modern university was born in a very different world from the current one, a world where only a tiny minority of the population went into higher education, yet many academics have been reluctant to make any allowances for massification. Italian universities, for instance, still insist that all students undergo a viva voce examination by a full professor, lasting an average of about five minutes.


What, if anything, can be done? Techno-utopians believe that higher education is ripe for revolution. The university, they say, is a hopelessly antiquated institution, wedded to outdated practices such as tenure and lectures, and incapable of serving a new world of mass audiences and just-in-time information. “Thirty years from now the big university campuses will be relics,” says Peter Drucker, a veteran management guru. “I consider the American research university of the past 40 years to be a failure.” Fortunately, in his view, help is on the way in the form of internet tuition and for-profit universities.


Cultural conservatives, on the other hand, believe that the best way forward is backward. The two ruling principles of modern higher-education policy—democracy and utility—are “degradations of the academic dogma”, to borrow a phrase from the late Robert Nisbet, another sociologist. They think it is foolish to waste higher education on people who would rather study “Seinfeld” than Socrates, and disingenuous to confuse the pursuit of truth with the pursuit of profit.


The conservative argument falls at the first hurdle: practicality. Higher education is rapidly going the way of secondary education: it is becoming a universal aspiration. The techno-utopian position is superficially more attractive. The internet will surely influence teaching, and for-profit companies are bound to shake up a moribund marketplace. But there are limits.


A few years ago a report by Coopers & Lybrand crowed that online education could eliminate the two biggest costs from higher education: “The first is the need for bricks and mortar; traditional campuses are not necessary. The second is full-time faculty. [Online] learning involves only a small number of professors, but has the potential to reach a huge market of students.” That is nonsense. The human touch is much more vital to higher education than is high technology. Education is not just about transmitting a body of facts, which the internet does pretty well. It is about learning to argue and reason, which is best done in a community of scholars.


This survey will argue that the most significant development in higher education is the emergence of a super-league of global universities. This is revolutionary in the sense that these institutions regard the whole world as their stage, but also evolutionary in that they are still wedded to the ideal of a community of scholars who combine teaching with research.


The problem for policymakers is how to create a system of higher education that balances the twin demands of excellence and mass access, that makes room for global elite universities while also catering for large numbers of average students, that exploits the opportunities provided by new technology while also recognising that education requires a human touch.


As it happens, we already possess a successful model of how to organise higher education: America's. That country has almost a monopoly on the world's best universities (see table 1), but also provides access to higher education for the bulk of those who deserve it. The success of American higher education is not just a result of money (though that helps); it is the result of organisation. American universities are much less dependent on the state than are their competitors abroad. They derive their income from a wide variety of sources, from fee-paying students to nostalgic alumni, from hard-headed businessmen to generous philanthropists. And they come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes, from Princeton and Yale to Kalamazoo community college.


This survey will offer two pieces of advice for countries that are trying to create successful higher-education systems, be they newcomers such as India and China or failed old hands such as Germany and Italy. First: diversify your sources of income. The bargain with the state has turned out to be a pact with the devil. Second: let a thousand academic flowers bloom. Universities, including for-profit ones, should have to compete for customers. A sophisticated economy needs a wide variety of universities pursuing a wide variety of missions. These two principles reinforce each other: the more that the state's role contracts, the more educational variety will flourish.

Gaza

Pictures that say a thousand words....


Tuesday, January 6, 2009

Living on Borrowed Time in a Stolen Land

By Gilad AtzmonJanuary 04, 2009 "Information Clearinghouse" --
Communicating with Israelis may leave one bewildered. Even now when the Israeli Air Force is practicing murder in broad daylight of hundreds of civilians, elderly persons, women and children, the Israeli people manage to convince themselves that they are the real victims in this violent saga.

Those who are familiar intimately with Israeli people realise that they are completely uninformed about the roots of the conflict that dominates their lives. Rather often Israelis manage to come up with some bizarre arguments that may make a lot of sense within the Israeli discourse, yet make no sense whatsoever outside of the Jewish street. Such an argument goes as follows: ‘those Palestinians, why do they insist upon living on our land (Israel), why can’t they just settle in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon or any other Arab country?’ Another Hebraic pearl of wisdom sounds like this: ‘what is wrong with these Palestinians? We gave them water, electricity, education and all they do is try to throw us to the sea’.

Astonishingly enough, the Israelis even within the so-called ‘left’ and even the educated ‘left’ fail to understand who the Palestinians are, where they come from and what they stand for. They fail to grasp that for the Palestinians, Palestine is home. Miraculously, the Israelis manage to fail to grasp that Israel had been erected at the expense of the Palestinian people, on Palestinian land, on Palestinian villages, towns, fields and orchards. The Israelis do not realise that Palestinians in Gaza and in refugee camps in the region are actually dispossessed people from Ber Shive, Yafo, Tel Kabir, Shekh Munis, Lod, Haifa, Jerusalem and many more towns and villages. If you wonder how come the Israelis don’t know their history, the answer is pretty simple, they have never been told. The circumstances that led to the Israeli Palestinian conflict are well hidden within their culture. Traces of pre-1948 Palestinian civilisation on the land had been wiped out. Not only the Nakba, the 1948 ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Palestinians, is not part of the Israeli curriculum, it is not even mentioned or discussed in any Israeli official or academic forum.

In the very centre of almost every Israeli town one can a find a 1948 memorial statue displaying a very bizarre, almost abstract, pipe work. The plumbing feature is called Davidka and it is actually a 1948 Israeli mortar cannon. Interestingly enough, the Davidka was an extremely ineffective weapon. Its shells wouldn’t reach more than 300 meters and would cause very limited damage. Though the Davidika would cause just minimal harm, it produced a lot of noise. According to the Israeli official historical narrative, the Arabs i.e., Palestinians, simply ran away for their lives once they heard the Davidka from afar. According to the Israeli narrative, the Jews i.e., ‘new Israelis’ did a bit of fireworks and the ‘Arab cowards’ just ran off like idiots. In the Israeli official narrative there is no mention of the many orchestrated massacres conducted by the young IDF and the paramilitary units that preceded it. There is no mention also of the racist laws that stop Palestinians[1][1] from returning to their homes and lands.

The meaning of the above is pretty simple. Israelis are totally unfamiliar with the Palestinian cause. Hence, they can only interpret the Palestinian struggle as a murderous irrational lunacy. Within the Israeli Judeo- centric solipsistic universe, the Israeli is an innocent victim and the Palestinian is no less than a savage murderer.

This grave situation that leaves the Israeli in the dark regarding his past demolishes any possibility of future reconciliation. Since the Israeli lacks the minimal comprehension of the conflict, he cannot contemplate any possible resolution except extermination or cleansing of the ‘enemy’. All the Israeli is entitled to know are various phantasmic narratives of Jewish suffering. Palestinian pain is completely foreign to his ears. ‘Palestinian right of return’ sounds to him like an amusing idea. Even the most advanced ‘Israeli humanists’ are not ready to share the land with its indigenous inhabitants. This doesn’t leave the Palestinians with many options but to liberate themselves against all odds. Clearly, there is no partner for peace on the Israel side.

This week we all learned more about the ballistic capability of Hamas. Evidently, Hamas was rather restrained with Israel for more than a long while. It refrained from escalating the conflict to the whole of southern Israel. It occurred to me that the barrages of Qassams that have been landing sporadically on Sderot and Ashkelon were actually nothing but a message from the imprisoned Palestinians. First it was a message to the stolen land, homes fields and orchards: ‘Our beloved soil, we didn’t forget, we are still here fighting for you, sooner rather than later, we will come back, we will start again where we had stopped’. But it was also a clear message to the Israelis. ‘You out there, in Sderot, Beer Sheva, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Tel Aviv and Haifa, whether you realise it or not, you are actually living on our stolen land. You better start to pack because your time is running out, you have exhausted our patience. We, the Palestinian people, have nothing to lose anymore’.

Let’s face it, realistically the situation in Israel is rather grave. Two years ago it was Hezbollah rockets that pounded northern Israel. This week the Hamas proved beyond doubt that it is capable of serving the South of Israel with some cocktail of ballistic vengeance. Both in the case of the Hezbollah and the case of the Hamas, Israel was left with no military answer. It can no doubt kill civilians but it fails to stop the rocket barrage. The IDF lacks the means of protecting Israel unless covering Israel with a solid concrete roof is a viable solution. At the end of the day, they might be planning just that (link).

But this is far from the end of the story. In fact it is just the beginning. Every Middle East expert knows that Hamas can seize control of the West Bank within hours. In fact, PA and Fatah control in the West Bank is maintained by the IDF. Once Hamas takes the West Bank, the biggest Israeli population centre will be left to the mercy of Hamas. For those who fail to see, this would be the end of Jewish Israel. It may happen later today, it may happen in three months or in five years, it isn’t matter of ‘if’ but rather matter of ‘when’. By that time, the whole of Israel will be within firing range of Hamas and Hezbollah, Israeli society will collapse, its economy will be ruined. The price of a detached villa in Northern Tel Aviv would equal a shed in Kiryat Shmone or Sderot. By the time a single rocket hits Tel Aviv, the Zionist dream will be over.

The IDF generals know it, the Israeli leaders know it. This is why they stepped up the war against the Palestinian into extermination. The Israelis do not plan upon invading Gaza. They have lost nothing there. All they want is to finish the Nakba. They drop bombs on Palestinians in order to wipe them out. They want the Palestinians out of the region. It is obviously not going to work, Palestinians will stay. Not only they will they stay, their day of return to their land is coming closer as Israel has been exploiting its deadliest tactics.

This is exactly where Israeli escapism comes into play. Israel has passed the ‘point of no return’. Its doomed fate is deeply engraved in each bomb it drops on Palestinian civilians. There is nothing Israel can do to save itself. There is no exit strategy. It can’t negotiate its way out because neither the Israelis nor their leadership understand the elementary parameters involved in the conflict. Israel lacks the military power to conclude the battle. It may manage to kill Palestinian grassroots leaders, it has been doing it for years, yet Palestinian resistance and persistence is growing fierce rather than weakening. As an IDF intelligence general predicted already at the first Intifada. ‘In order to win, all Palestinians have to do is to survive’. They survive and they are indeed winning.

Israeli leaders understand it all. Israel has already tried everything, unilateral withdrawal, starvation and now extermination. It thought to evade the demographic danger by shrinking into an intimate cosy Jewish ghetto. Nothing worked. It is Palestinian persistence in the shape of Hamas politics that defines the future of the region.

All that is left to Israelis is to cling to their blindness and escapism to evade their devastating grave fate that has become immanent already. All along their way down, the Israelis will sing their familiar various victim anthems. Being imbued in a self-centred supremacist reality, they will be utterly involved in their own pain yet completely blind to the pain they inflict on others. Uniquely enough, the Israelis are operating as a unified collective when dropping bombs on others, yet, once being slightly hurt, they all manage to become monads of vulnerable innocence. It is this discrepancy between the self-image and the way they are seen by the rest of us which turns the Israeli into a monstrous exterminator. It is this discrepancy that stops Israelis from grasping their own history, it is that discrepancy that stops them from comprehending the repeated numerous attempts to destroy their State. It is that discrepancy that stops Israelis from understanding the meaning of the Shoah so can they prevent the next one. It is this discrepancy that stops Israelis from being part of humanity.

Once again Jews will have to wander into an unknown fate. To a certain extent, I myself have started my journey a while ago.

[1][1] Jews only law of return- http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1950_1959/Law of Return 5710-1950

read more- http://www.australiansforpalestine.com/press_room/briefing/papers/BriefingPaperNo35_17Aug07_TheLawofReturncopy.pdf

Saturday, January 3, 2009

Rumah

Rumah ini telah tiada. Namun gambarnya, alhamdulillah, masih ada. Gambar rumah ini mengingatkan aku seribu satu kenangan....



Brilliant young economists

Emerging economists
International bright young things
Dec 30th 2008
From The Economist print edition
The next generation of economists do their best work somewhere between the field clinic and the dissection room

Illustration by Otto Dettmer

TWENTY years ago The Economist wrote about eight young economists who were making a big splash in their discipline and beyond. One of them, Paul Krugman, recently won the Nobel prize for his models of international trade and economic geography. Ten years later we tried to repeat the trick, identifying another eight young stars, many of whom were taking their discipline far off-piste. One has since achieved even greater fame than anticipated. Steven Levitt of the University of Chicago became a household name as co-author of “Freakonomics”, a bestselling book published in 2005.

“Freakonomics” owed its origins to a profile of Mr Levitt in the New York Times magazine in 2003. Its success has won a new readership for economists, beyond the business section and the opinion columns, in the glossier pages of the weekend supplements. The best young economists, as a consequence, have already attracted plenty of attention. That leaves us in a bit of a quandary. We feel like lonely prospectors, who, returning to a favourite stream, find it overtaken by a gold rush.

Undeterred, we have given the prospecting pan another shake. We asked leading authorities in the discipline to name the best young economists in the world. Between them, they proposed over 50 researchers, but several names recurred on many lists. We have sifted the 50 down to eight, all of whom received their PhDs in the past ten years.
The family tree

Several of the scholars in this year’s batch trace their intellectual ancestry back to those we picked ten years ago. For example, Jesse Shapiro of the University of Chicago and Roland Fryer of Harvard are recognisably the intellectual heirs of Mr Levitt. They share the same knack for finding ingenious ways to answer unlikely questions, often by plundering forgotten troves of data.

At just 29, Mr Shapiro can already boast a collection of eye-catching findings worthy of a sequel to “Freakonomics”. He has shown that some judgments are best made without too much information: people are better at predicting the winner of American gubernatorial elections when they watch the candidates with the sound turned off. Harsher jail conditions do nothing to deter prisoners from reoffending. If anything they encourage recidivism. Preschoolers who watch television do better academically than children who don’t, especially if their parents have little education or poor English.

Mr Fryer’s ambition is to unravel the causes of black underachievement in America, especially in education. His search for explanations extends beyond racism and poverty to contemplate the role of a self-defeating culture. He calculates that a black student who earns straight A grades will have 1.5 fewer friends from his ethnic group than an equally swotty white student.

Michael Kremer, another of those we cited ten years ago, can also claim an intellectual relative in this year’s cohort. Esther Duflo of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) received more recommendations than any other economist. Some who didn’t nominate her thought she was too established to count as “new”.

With her colleague, Abhijit Banerjee, Ms Duflo and Mr Kremer have remade development economics, nudging it away from its concern with policies, towards a preoccupation with projects. They study economic development as seen from the field, clinic or school, rather than the finance ministry. They might be called the “peace corps” of economists, bringing the blessing of their investigative technique to the neglected villages of India or the denuded farms of western Kenya.

Ms Duflo has made her name carrying out randomised trials of development projects, such as fertiliser subsidies and school recruitment. In these trials, people are randomly assigned to a “treatment” group, which benefits from the project, and a “control” group, which does not. By comparing the average outcome of each group, she can establish whether the project worked and precisely how well.

In one study, Ms Duflo and her colleagues showed that mothers in the Indian state of Rajasthan are three times as likely to have their children vaccinated if they are rewarded with a kilogram of daal (lentils) at the immunisation camp. The result is useful to aid workers, but puzzling to economists: why should such a modest incentive (worth less than 50 cents) make such a big difference? Immunisation can save a child’s life; a bag of lentils should not sway the mother’s decision either way.

Randomised trials “give you the chance to be surprised”, Ms Duflo says. Had they arrived at this result using some other method, she and her colleagues would have assumed they had made a mistake. But randomisation removes such doubts, showing that it was indeed the lentils that made the difference. The result cannot be dismissed; it must be explained.

The approach has its critics. A randomised trial can prove that a remedy works, without necessarily showing why. It may not do much to illuminate the mechanism between the lever the experimenters pull and the results they measure. This makes it harder to predict how other people would respond to the remedy or how the same people would respond to an alternative. And even if the trial works on average, that does not mean it will work for any particular individual.

The randomistas, as Ms Duflo and her comrades are called, liken their studies to the clinical trials that prove the efficacy of new drugs. But the ultimate ambition of economics is for something more akin to anatomy. Researchers hope to dissect the underlying physiology of an economic problem, revealing how the leg bone is connected to the thigh bone. With a full anatomy of behaviour—what economists call a structural model—they can determine if a policy or project will work even before it has been attempted.

The early anatomists of the human body suffered from a shortage of fresh cadavers to work on. Medical students would trek long distances to watch a dissection performed. Economists often find themselves in a similar predicament. Short of good empirical meat, they have to rely on elaborate theory and guesswork to fill in what they cannot observe.
Amy Finkelstein, also of MIT, the fourth of our young stars, has anatomised the market for annuities in Britain. The industry suffers from “asymmetric information”: customers may know more than the provider about their chances of dying. Unfortunately, this private information is as hidden from economists as it is from the annuity company. Ms Finkelstein and a colleague, James Poterba, have shown how to infer the cost of this unseen problem from what can be observed, namely the kind of annuities people choose and the length of their life after retirement.

Like Ms Finkelstein, Raj Chetty, recently hired by Harvard from the University of California, Berkeley, is a promising young “public economist”: a student of tax and spend. He has great respect for structural models. But in a recent paper he makes the case for judicious short cuts. Often you don’t need to dissect a whole body; a few choice incisions are enough.

For example, he wanted to know whether policymakers should raise unemployment benefits. To answer this question, a structural model would need to specify how much a dollar is worth to a person on the dole, as compared with someone in work. It would also need to quantify the burden a job hunt imposes. This isn’t easy to find out. But Mr Chetty argues it is unnecessary.

He gleans all the information he needs by looking at the time it takes unemployed people to find a new job. Unsurprisingly, they take longer when their benefits are more generous. This is usually attributed to “moral hazard”—people take less care to escape a danger, such as joblessness, if they are insured against it. But Mr Chetty shows that skewed incentives account for only 40% of the delay.

The rest is due to what he calls a “liquidity effect”. The unemployed typically have few liquid assets to fall back on and little chance of a loan from the bank. This forces them to rush their job search. If they had savings to dip into or credit to tap, they might search with greater deliberation. This kind of dallying is, in a sense, optimal. The unemployed decide that an unhurried job search is worth the extra cost of depleted savings or heavier loan repayments.
Higher benefits ease this liquidity problem. Raising benefits by $1 a week would do as much social good as raising American GDP by $290m, Mr Chetty calculates, although government loans to the unemployed might do better still.

Twenty years ago macroeconomists dominated our list of the best young thinkers, but they are under-represented in this year’s batch. We found plenty of agreement about the three or four young macro thinkers most likely to succeed, but surprisingly little confidence that they would. One leader in the field suspected their work represented a moment of beauty, not truth. Another complained that the youngsters lacked the “vision thing” that distinguished the greats of the past.

Ramsey revisited

If so, perhaps they can blame the times that produced them. They came of age during the Great Moderation, a period of macroeconomic tranquillity and intellectual consensus. They are in thrall not to John Maynard Keynes, sage of the Depression, but to his Cambridge contemporary, Frank Ramsey, a precocious polymath who made his contributions in the prelapsarian 1920s. Ramsey was interested in how much of its income a nation should save so as to maximise its prosperity now and in the future. His work underpins much of modern macroeconomics, in which agents act today with an eye on tomorrow. But the framework is best suited to analysing steady accumulation, not violent cycles of speculation and liquidation. So it is not the obvious place to start to explain the world economy’s present predicament.

The macroeconomist nominated most often for our list was Iván Werning of MIT. Mr Werning is an economist’s economist; an elegant theorist, whose early contributions provided streamlined proofs that other thinkers could make use of. One of Mr Werning’s ambitions is to unite Ramsey’s work with that of another elegant theorist, Sir James Mirrlees. Sir James won the Nobel prize in 1996 for exploring how best to set taxes when people can disguise their true worth from the revenue collector. Mr Werning asks the same question, but in the forward-looking, macroeconomic setting provided by Ramsey.

Mr Werning and his co-authors have so far derived at least two theoretical results of note. The first is to show that the unemployed have sufficient incentive to find work, even if they receive unemployment benefits indefinitely. The second is that bequests from one generation to the next should be subsidised by the government, with smaller inheritances receiving higher rates of subsidy. Mr Werning and his co-author, Emmanuel Farhi (a young Harvard macroeconomist), point out that the biggest roll of the dice in life is the family you are born into. Their system of subsidies would take the edge off this uncertainty.

Two of the economists we highlighted ten years ago—David Laibson of Harvard and Matthew Rabin of Berkeley—were exponents of “behavioural economics”, incorporating the insights of psychology into the dismal science. The sub-discipline has continued to flourish in the decade since, seeping so far into the mainstream that its disciples no longer constitute a self-contained school. The randomistas, for example, often invoke behavioural explanations for their experimental results.

Xavier Gabaix of New York University, our seventh pick, is another example of someone who is au fait with behavioural economics but not defined by it. He has written papers with Mr Laibson, including one that explains why hotels can get away with overpricing the mini-bar. But his interests extend beyond the behavioural.

He has, for example, shown a fascination with “power laws”: tantalising statistical patterns that seem to crop up wherever you look hard enough. The size of cities, the pay of executives and the performance of the stockmarket all seem to follow such laws. For cities, the law can be crudely expressed as the “rank-size rule”. The second-biggest city will have roughly half the population of the biggest; the population of the third-ranked city will be one-third of the first’s, and so on. The relationship between executive pay and company size also obeys a power law: companies twice the size tend to pay their chief executives roughly 25% more.

These curious regularities have more than numerological appeal. They give clues about what can and cannot explain the size and growth of the things they describe. For example, the rank-size rule could not hold if small cities grew systematically faster than big ones, or vice versa. The power law of executive pay also requires a particular kind of economics to explain it. Mr Gabaix thinks the “economics of superstars”, invented by Sherwin Rosen, fits the bill.

Top executives may differ only slightly in their talents, just as sports champions differ only slightly from runners-up. But the better managers nonetheless get hired by the bigger firms, just as the best entertainers sing to the largest audience. This means an executive’s small edge in managerial skill is amplified, because his talents go to work on a bigger canvas. Mr Gabaix made a splash in 2006 when he concluded that the “excessive” pay of chief executives was not necessarily excessive. Compensation may have grown sixfold from 1980 to 2003 not because managers were six times greedier, but because the firms they ran were six times bigger.

If the size of firms obeys a power law, economies will comprise some very big firms and a long tail of small ones. The fortunes of the biggest companies might then stir the whole economy, Mr Gabaix conjectures. The $24 billion dividend paid by Microsoft in December 2004, for example, added 3% to America’s personal income that month. Mr Gabaix calls for a more “granular” approach to macroeconomics, which would weigh the contribution of big firms to national aggregates.

This granular view is already taking hold in studies of international trade. Countries, after all, do not trade with each other; companies do. A few firms usually account for the lion’s share of a country’s exports: in America, the top 10% of exporters account for 96% of the country’s foreign sales, and only 4% of firms export at all.

These observations (drawn from work by Andrew Bernard of Dartmouth College among others) demand a theory to explain them. That gap has been filled by Marc Melitz, a trade economist at Princeton University and our final new star.

Mr Melitz is a pioneer of the “new, new trade theory”, which succeeds the “new” trade theory propounded by Mr Krugman almost 30 years ago. The source of its novelty is its recognition that firms differ, and only the best firms export. In America, for example, exporting factories are more than twice as big as plants that do not sell beyond their shores, and they squeeze 14% more out of their workers.

In Mr Melitz’s theory firms first prove themselves at home, discovering their own limits and abilities. Only the best then venture overseas. Entering a foreign market is an expensive endeavour, he points out, even before firms encounter the tariffs or transport costs that preoccupy most trade models. An exporter must find and introduce itself to distant customers, comply with alien regulations and set up distribution channels abroad. One study found that it cost Colombian chemical factories over $1m to enter a foreign market.

The gains from trade also differ in Mr Melitz’s model. In the new trade theory that preceded it, international commerce raises the productivity of firms by enlarging their market, allowing them to reap economies of scale. In Mr Melitz’s model, trade raises the productivity of industries, not by allowing firms to grow bigger, but by giving the better firms a bigger share of the market. Foreign competition sifts and sorts firms, winnowing out the weakest firms and leaving a greater share of the market to their stronger rivals.

Just as Mr Krugman found a clean way to account for economies of scale, Mr Melitz handles the heterogeneity of firms without spoiling the lines of his model. It now serves as a pliant workhorse for lots of “granular” thinking in the field.

Bodice rippers

Over 60 years ago Paul Samuelson laid down “the foundations of economic analysis” in his seminal work of that name. In the introduction, he describes his dawning realisation of the underlying unity of the subject. As he laboured in each field—consumer behaviour, public finance, international trade, business cycles—he encountered similar problems, which yielded to the same set of mathematical techniques. Mr Samuelson’s book squeezed a shapeless body of economic knowledge into a tight corset.

In the decades since, the laces have been unpicked. It is not just that economists are nosing into new fields of social behaviour. They have been doing that at least since Gary Becker of the University of Chicago wrote about crime and the family in the 1960s and 1970s. But today’s economists show no great attachment to the rational model of behaviour that guided Mr Becker. Economic theory has become so eclectic that ingenious researchers can usually cook up a plausible model to explain whatever empirical results they find interesting. Economics is now defined neither by its subject matter nor by its method.

What, then, unites these eight young stars and the discipline they may come to dominate? Economists still share a taste for the Greek alphabet: they like to provide formal, algebraic accounts of the behaviour they explain. And they pride themselves on the sophistication of their investigative methods. They are usually better at teasing confessions out of data than their rivals in other social sciences. What defines economics? Economics is what economists do—the best of them, anyway.

The Meaning of Economic Development

“From Seers to Sen: The Meaning of Economic Development”

E. Wayne Nafziger

How has the meaning of economic development changed during the twenty years of WIDER’s existence? Two markers are Dudley Seers, “The Meaning of Development” (1967, 1979), for the earlier period and Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (1999), for the later. Here the meaning of development also encompasses measures and strategies of development and approaches to its study. Moreover, I examine works beyond these markers to provide more detail of the two men’s views.

Both men were critical of the development literature of their times. For Seers, neoclassical economics had a flawed paradigm and dependency theory a lack of policy realism. After the fall of state socialism in 1989-1991, the ideological struggles among economists diminished. Neoclassicism’s Washington Consensus of the World Bank, IMF, and the U.S. government reigned (Williamson 1993, pp. 1329-1336; 1994, pp. 26-28). Sen did not focus on ideological issues but, according to the Nobel prize committee, “restored an ethical dimension to the discussion of economic problems” such as development.

According to Seers (1979) the purpose of development is to reduce poverty, inequality, and unemployment. For Sen (1999), development involves reducing deprivation or broadening choice. Deprivation represents a multidimensional view of poverty that includes hunger, illiteracy, illness and poor health, powerlessness, voicelessness, insecurity, humiliation, and a lack of access to basic infrastructure (Narayan et al. 2000, pp. 4-5).

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The Meaning of Development

The meaning of development: the example of Mafia Island

Lecture given by Professor Pat Caplan, Goldsmiths College, University of London
At the New Lizu Hotel, Kilindoni, Mafia Island, 11th August 1994
For CHAMAMA (Changio cha Maendeleo ya Mafia)


Introduction

It is a great honour to be asked to address such a distinguished gathering of Mafia people and I thank you in advance for coming to listen to me tonight. I feel very diffident about speaking to you on the subject of Mafia's development since I am not a Tanzanian. However, many people in Mafia have been kind enough to call me 'mwenyeji', and to treat me as an honorary Mafian, and for my part, I do feel that Mafia is my second home, which contains my adopted mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters and children, and now grandchildren. In the 28 years I have been coming to Mafia, since I first arrived in 1965, I have learned many things, and people here have been glad to teach me. But there are still many things I do not know, so you will forgive any shortcomings in what I have to say tonight. Also my experience had been mainly in the north of the island - I have spent much less time in the south.

What is the meaning of development?

I do not think that we can measure development by the number of big hotels, by how many bottles of Coca Cola and Pepsi-Cola are consumed, or how many cars are owned by rich people. Development, real progress, means the following:

• Health and well being of all
• Education for all
• Fair rewards for labour
• Improvement not only of the standard of living but the quality of life.

How do we achieve development?

• we need to take account of local conditions, we cannot assume that what is right in one place will work somewhere else
• we need to respect and use local knowledge - people who live in an area are the real experts on that place.
• we need to listen to what local people say and what they think their needs are.

In short, development begins from below, it cannot be imposed from above. That is not to say that we cannot use outside help, expertise, technology. Of course we can. But we must not adopt it blindly, we must think carefully about what will work, what is right in this place, at this time, for these people.

Who is development for?

In some countries of the south of the Third World, development is said to be taking place. There you can see big buildings in the cities - banks, factories, hotels. (India would be a good example here.) Yet the people in the countryside mostly remain poor. The ones who grow the food do not have enough to eat themselves. That is not real development, it is development for some and not for others.

Since independence Tanzania has tried to avoid such mistakes, and I hope that it will continue to try and do so. Otherwise it will end up as a country of two nations - a small number of rich people and a large number of poor people. One of the most important things to note about Tanzania is that since independence, it has enjoyed peace and stability which is rare in Africa today. There is no religious conflict, there is no tribalism, there has been no civil war, or war with neighbours. When we look at the rest of Africa we can see that this is a great blessing: Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Sudan, Burundi and now the terrible events in Rwanda should make us all aware that peace is a great blessing.

Development: Improvements over last 30 years

Each time that I come to Mafia, people ask me what changes I see and what developments, if
any, have taken place. Many say "there has been no development since independence". That is not true. I want to begin on a positive note, so let me first of all say what improvements I have noticed between the 1960s and the 1990s:

a) Education:

When I came in 1965, there were very few primary schools on the island, and they usually had only 4 standards. The very few children who went on to standards 5 and beyond had to go to the mainland. Furthermore, not all children went to school, and of those who did, it was mostly the boys.

Over the next decade, there was a big improvement; by the time of my next visit in 1976 virtually all children were in school, including girls. There were more primary schools, and some had expanded beyond standard 4. (In Kanga village , for example, there was by this time a 6 standard school for Kanga and Bweni). But even by 1985, when I returned for the third time, hardly any children were getting to secondary school, and again, for those who passed, there was the necessity to leave the island. On this fourth visit, I am very happy to find not only more primary schools (for example, Kanga and Bweni now each have their own school), but also Mafia's very first secondary school, and I want to congratulate all those whose hard work made this possible.

b) Health

At the time of my first visit in 1965, there were a few village dispensaries and a small hospital in Kilindoni. The village dispensers had only minimal training. By 1976, midwives had begun to be sent to the villages, and by 1985, MCH clinics had been set up along Rural Medical centres. Today, the number of rural medical centres has increased - Bweni, for example, will soon open its own, instead of Bweni people having to come 5 miles to Kanga for treatment. Furthermore, the staff are better trained: in Kanga today, the paramedic even knows dental extraction. There are also more staff: Kanga centre now has 4 people: paramedic, nurse, midwife and a mama afya.

Virtually all children now get immunized against tuberculosis, polio, measles, diphtheria, whooping cough and tetanus. The growth of children is monitored with cards. pregnant women get immunised and receive iron and folic acid tablets. They can have their babies in the health centres and receive skilled help. All of these are important improvements in the health of everyone, including small children and pregnant women.

c) Water

When I came in 1965, Mafia was in the middle of one of its periodic droughts. In Kanga village, water was very scarce - people often had to go long distances for water. I can even remember carrying water from Kirongwe by Land Rover on one occasion. The wells were in a poor state - unlined and not deep enough. Since that time, the water supply has improved, with better wells. This is very important for two reasons: clean water is vital to health and the availability of a nearby water supply helps lessen women's work load.

The limitations of these developments

No one will want to claim that the situation with regard to education and health is now perfect; the schools are often under-equipped, they may not have enough teachers, books desks or other facilities. Furthermore, although having a secondary school on the island is very good, it is expensive for parents to send their children there, especially if they are living far away and the children have to rent accommodation, pay for their food etc. So not all children who pass the entrance examination will succeed in going to the secondary school.

As far a health is concerned, there are problems in the implementation of the programme: the drug supply is insufficient, the immunization programme sometimes has to stop because of lack of vaccines, or kerosene for the fridge in which it is necessary to keep them. Not everyone is near to a Rural Medical Centre, and people sometimes have to walk long distances to get there. Staff have to leave their work each month in order to go and collect their wages from the District Capital.

Some of these factors are difficult to control locally: the supply of drugs depends for example on what is sent by the government, so does the supply of teachers, school books and equipment. But as has been shown by he opening of the secondary school, citizens can make the government at various levels aware of their needs by pressing for them, and also seek ways in which problems can be solved, perhaps by raising some of the cost themselves.

Problems of development in Mafia and beyond

In other respects, however, it is true that there has been little development on Mafia. Indeed in many ways people are poorer now than they were in the 1960s. Why is this the case? In order to understand this situation, we need to look at different levels:

- the world economy
- the national economy
- the district and region
- the village
- the household

I will look at each of these in turn, but it must be clearly understood that they are inter-related very closely - what happens at one level affects the others.

a) The world economy

Tanzania, even Mafia Island, is part of the world economy. Tanzania imports goods from abroad and exports goods such as tea, coffee, sisal, coconut oil and so on. But the world economy at the moment is in recession. Even in the developed countries, the economies are in poor shape and there is very high unemployment. Nonetheless, the way in which the world economy is organised means that the powerful developed nations, such as the USA, the European countries and Japan, can set the terms of trade with the developing countries of the Asia, Latin America and Africa. This means two things: they can set the prices which they will pay for commodities which Tanzania exports and they also set prices for their own goods. Over the last 20 or so years, the price of goods which Tanzania imports - oil, spare parts, machinery - has been increasing, while the price which Tanzania receives for its exports has been declining. In other words, even to purchase one tractor in the 1990s, Tanzania may need to export twice or three times as much coffee or tea as it did in the 1980s. Furthermore, the developed countries of the North may set tariff barriers on goods coming from the South, which makes exporting even more difficult.

b) The Tanzanian economy

As a result of these and other factors, Tanzania has been forced into a situation where it has had to borrow large amounts of money, especially from the International Monetary Fund. Such money has to be repaid, and it also carries interest. Tanzania is not alone in this: most sub-Saharan African countries now have heavy debts and are paying each year more in interest payments than they are receiving in either loans or aid. Such a heavy load of debt seriously blocks development. Furthermore Tanzania has had conditions imposed upon its loan by the IMF:

- devaluation of currency (making imports more expensive)
- wage freeze (in spite of inflation) lowering the standard of living for workers.
- abolition of price controls (which has meant prices have risen a great deal)
- increase in interest rates (making local loans more expensive)
- removal of import controls (allowing more goods to be brought in from outside)
- cuts in government expenditure (which means less money for social services such as health and education)

c) The District Economy

What has been the effect of this at the District level, that is, for the Island of Mafia?

- more goods are available now, but they are very expensive- wages, for those who have paid jobs, have not increased in line with inflation.
- food prices have gone up a lot
- health and education budgets have neither kept pace with increasing population nor with local needs, indeed, in real terms they have been cut.
- people are having to pay fees to send their children to school, and soon they will be asked to pay for medical services and drugs.

The majority of people on Mafia are small farmers and they depend upon two things: their own subsistence cultivation to grow rice, cassava, sweet potatoes etc. - and cash crops particularly coconuts and, in the south, cashewnuts. If the price paid to producers of cash crops increases in line with inflation then they will not find price increases of goods they need to purchase so difficult. But the reality, at least as far as coconuts is concerned, is that prices have not only failed to increase, they have actually halved in the Dar es Salaam markets since last year. Currently, those exporting coconuts from the island to Dar, by the time they have paid their transport expenses, barely cover their costs; they do not get any profit. But there are other local factors which inhibit the development of the economy on Mafia. Some of these at the village and household level l will discus in a moment but let us first look at the District as a whole.

i) infrastructure

The infrastructure is very poor - there are only two main roads, and both of these are in an appalling condition. As a result, transport is a major problem, vehicles quickly deteriorate, passengers are left stranded. Furthermore, transport to the mainland is not easy. People travel by mashua, which is not only risky, but uncomfortable and dependent upon tides and winds.

The plane service is too expensive for most people and is often delayed or cancelled. In any case, there are rarely enough seats for all those who want to go. I am told that there was a steamer service running for some time but that this is no longer the case. So Mafia is in many ways cut off from the mainland, and the difficulties faced by other parts of Tanzania are exacerbated by the fact of Mafia being an island. Communication with the rest of Tanzania is difficult, and slow. Even within the island, the main means of transport is by walking. Vehicles frequently break down and getting spares is difficult, slow and expensive. Government officials and workers find it difficult to travel round the island and keep in touch with people.

ii) Power

There is no form of power supply - except in Kilindoni and Utende. The main source of power is human labour, about which I will talk more in a moment. Even machinery which is operated without engines - bicycles for example - are in short supply and too expensive for most, and machinery to assist in cultivation is rarely available, whether this be complex machinery such as tractors, or simple machinery such as wheelbarrows, carts, handbills.

iii) Technology

The Ievel of technology for cultivation is very low, with the main tools being the small handhoe (jembe) and the mundu and the panga. Most agriculture is thus very labour-intensive, that is, it requires hours of backbreaking work for quite small returns. Little use is made of fertiliser or irrigation, and there is a heavy dependence upon rainfall. Since records began to be kept earlier this century Mafia has not been self-sufficient in food.

iv) Markets

The market for the main cash crops is far away: people have to export their nuts to DSM, which is done on a more or less individual basis.

Adaptation and survival techniques on Mafia

Yet people manage somehow to survive. They are prepared to walk long distances, whether to see their relatives, attend ceremonies (mashughuli), go to court, to government offices, to the District hospital and so on. They use ngalawa, mashua and majahazi to get to the mainland. Some villages have collectively purchased vehicles, even tractors. Many people work hard, using their own strength, to grow both food and cash crops. Indeed, as I shall go on to discuss in a moment, some of them work far too hard.

People look for new opportunities to make an income: for example in the northern villages, some of the young men are now fishing for lobster which is exported to Dar and beyond, and which fetches a better price than fish. So people are not unwilling to adapt, they do not lack initiative, they do look for new opportunities although few of these present themselves. When we look at how we can develop, it is easy to dream dreams. We could draw up a list and say, if we get these things, they will make us happy, they will mean development on Mafia:

- new roads
- more vehicles to transport people and goods around
- electricity in all viIIages
- telephones and postal services throughout the island.

Yet we all know these things are not all going to happen tomorrow, or even the day after. Many of them require large amounts of money which neither the District Council nor the government have available. So we have to think about how we can use what we have got to make small but significant changes and improvements in people's lives here on this island. We have land, we have sea. We have subsistence food crops, we have cash crops.

Towards the end of my speech, I shall be outlining some of the ways in which possibly we might think about using these resources more. We have considered so far the levels of world economy, national economy, and the district. I want to say more about the district economy and its possibilities towards the end of my talk, but first let us consider the village and the household.

d) The village economy

The village is a unit for administrative purposes: schools, clinics, local government. Villagers may cooperate on particular projects: buying a lorry for example, or helping build a clinic. But villages are not isolated economic units, they are linked to the rest of the island and beyond, and villagers themselves have networks of kinship all over the island and the rest of the coast including Zanzibar and Pemba.

Nonetheless, there are differences between villages: in the north, the villages have always been nucleated, each one surrounded by its belt of bushland. In the south, on the other hand most of the land is planted with coconuts and there is less scope for subsistence cultivation. Some villages are nearer to the sea and people engage in fishing, others are inland. Some are nearer to the administrative centre, Killindoni, others are far away, and communication without either a good transport network, postal or telephone system, is difficult. So each village has its own specific conditions.

It is primarily at the village level that any development must take place, for that is where people live. If people themselves are to be involved in development - and that is the only real and lasting form of development - then this must be at village level, with the different conditions and needs of each village being taken into account. No government official, no expert on agriculture, fishing or animal husbandry knows as much about any village as the people who live in it. So development has to use local knowledge together with new knowledge and expertise coming from outside. Development has to come from below, as well as from above. But new ideas, techniques must also be brought in and new information disseminated to villagers through meetings, seminars and courses.

e) The household economy

The household is the major unit for both production - growing food and cash crops – and reproductIon - having children and bringing them up, looking after household members. In theory a household should be a mutually beneficial unit: parents cooperate to grow food and provide cash needs, care for children, who in turn care for them when they are old. All household members should share the fruits of labour. But is this what actually happens? Not always. Some members of the household do better than others. Let us look more closely at the factors involved here:

i) work loads and the sexual division of labour

This means that men and women do different work. Men do most of the work involved in clearing bush fields in the north of the island. They cut down the bush, set fire to it when it is dried, and build fences around the fields to keep out pests such as wild pigs. Women do most of the work of planting rice, weeding it, guarding the crop and harvesting. Either men or women may grow cassava and sweet potatoes. If we look at food production in terms of hours or days of labour, we find that on average, women spend a lot more time in the fields than do men. Men do most of the work connected with the cultivation of coconuts, since they own more trees than do women. This is partly because of the inheritance laws, partly because men are more likely than women to plant trees themselves or pay for others to do so. They arrange for nuts to be feIled and husked, and for the transportation of nuts to the coast and to DSM for sale. So men may work hard, but only for short period, while women's work is continuous.

Furthermore, because men control most of the household cash, they are the one who can decide how to spend it - whether to buy food and which kind, clothes, cigarettes and who gets what. Men are also the ones to receive most of the cash income, since they not only own most of the coconut trees, but also engage in other income-generating activities, such as fishing, casual labour in the village, migrant labour to the city. Women have few sources of cash: they may own a few trees (but are dependent on men to market the nuts), otherwise their main source of cash income is from making the beautiful mats for which Mafia is famous. However, a woman is unlikely with all her other work to be able to make more than 6-8 mats per annum, and she sells each at l,000/- to a local (male) trader, who in turns sells them for 2,OOO/- in DSM.

Islamic law states that men should take care of the cash needs of the household: food, clothes, school fees, daily items like kerosene, tea, sugar, while women perform most of the domestic labour: processing food (threshing, winnowing, pounding, cooking, going for firewood, going for water, washing vessels). Looking after children (breast feeding, bathing, cleaning). The reality is that most women are involved in the production of food for the household, and many of them are also having to find cash for household needs when the husband, if they have one,is unwilling or unable to provide sufficiently. So we often find that women's work load is as follows:

- cultivation of food crops
- domestic Iabour including food processing
- seeking some cash income e.g. mat making

In the studies that l have done in the last few years, the time budgets of men and women are strikingly different. Many women work all day in the fields at busy times, men rarely work a full day. Women do almost all of the domestic Iabour, perhaps aided by older children or other female relatives. This can involve fetching several buckets of water each day, sometimes from distant wells, fetching firewood, pounding rice (a very tiring job as I know when I have done it), cooking in a smoky kitchen. Domestic work has to be done every single day throughout the year.

ii) fertility and its effects on production

In addition to all of these tasks, women are the ones who become pregnant and bear children, whom they breastfeed for two years. The fertility rate in Tanzania is very high: the average number of live births per woman is seven and there are many women on Mafia who have had many more pregnancies than that. Many women begin bearing after an early marriage at the age of around 17 and continue to be either pregnant or lactating for most of their reproductive lives.

What is the effect of this workload on women and on their households?
- many women have ill-health, especially anaemia
- they may well give birth to small babies, who are more vulnerable to early death.

Women who are in an advanced stage of pregnancy or have just given birth, cannot cultivate to the same extent. Thus each year that a birth falls in the peak agricultural season, the likelihood is that the household will cultivate less that year, and thus grow less food of its own. As a result it has either to purchase more food, or to eat less. In other words, levels of production, especially of food crops, are affected by reproduction. Reproduction in turn is affected by production: if women work too had in pregnancy they may have miscarriages or small-for-dates babies who may die.

iii) The division of food in the household

This brings me to another issue, at the level of the household, and that is the way in which food is divided up, and the household's resources are shared out. In my research, I often found that when women serve up food they give more food and better food to men. Why?

- Our husbands will be angry if they do not get nice food.
- We are afraid of the men if we do not feed them properly
- Men need more food than women - the work they do is more important
- women can withstand hunger better than men - that is how God made them.

Yet the amount of food a person needs depends on several factors:

- their weight and height
- the amount of work they do - those who work more physically should get more
- their age
- their condition - thus women who are pregnant or lactating need more food than those who are not.

Much of the food in households on Mafia is purchased - few households grow enough to feed themselves for a whole year, so they buy food in shops, such as maize meal (unga ya dona). Furthermore, the kitoweo– such as fish, occasionally chicken or meat, beans – also has to be bought. This is the main source of protein and thus its distribution is very important, especially for growing children, to enable them to build both their bodies and their brains. One of the problems here, (and we find this problem elsewhere in the world), is that whenever the government or experts talk about ‘better food’ (chakula bora), especially for children, they say that women need to be educated. But often women are well aware of what food is needed, they just lack the power and resources to purchase it. Men, on the other hand, may well have both the power and resources, but they often lack the knowledge about the importance of good food for growing children and pregnant or lactating women.

Furthermore men may not see how much work women do - they may take it for granted that this is the way things are. Or they may devalue women's work to being of less importance than the work which they do. Thus it becomes 'invisible' work which is not rewarded either in terms of money or food. So what can be done to improve things at the household level?

Changes needed at household level

i) Decreasing women’s workloads

One way is to decrease women's work-load, especially during pregnancy or lactating. How can this be done? They could receive more help from other members of the household, including men. There is nothing wrong with a man helping in household work, what is wrong is for one human being to sit in idleness watching another wear herself out with too much work.
Another is to share the resources of the household more equally, including food.

ii) Reduction in fertility

Another is to reduce the frequency of births, so that women have a chance to rest between bearing each child. This is important for her body to get back its strength, and it is also important that each child should have two years of breast-feeding, which confers immunities and supplies with protein. So women should not get pregnant again for at least two years after having a baby, preferably three, which would mean 3-4 year age gaps between children.
Nor should very young women or older women over 35 bear children. Young girls have not yet reached their full strength and they may bear babies with difficulty, while older women may not only already be tired from many pregnancies but also there is a greater danger of having handicapped children. If women do not start having babies until their twenties, this would also give them more chance to get educated and an educated mother means and educated family, one who can plan her life, her work, the well being of her children better. If there is a 3-4 year gap between pregnancies, and a shorter period of child-bearing, this would also decrease the overall fertility rate. For each household, there would not only be fewer mouths to fees, but also more resources for each child. Such children would be more likely to survive into adulthood because they would be better cared for.

iii) increase household food production and cash income

This will also have an effect on national and local development, for at present the national resources cannot possibly keep up with the population increase. In the three decades in which I have been working here, the three decades since independence, the population of Tanzania has more than doubled. Some will argue that Tanzania is a big country, and there is plenty of space. They argue that the main resource of the country is its people. But each child born needs the following:

- food
- immunisation
- growth monitoring
- schooling
- clothes
- job
- healthcare

This is expensive for each household, for each district, for the country as a whole. Again, in my own research I found that often women say that they would like to space their children more, to have a rest from childbearing, but their husbands may not agree. So again this is an issue about which men have to think carefully.

Conclusion and some suggestions

Earlier in my talk I said that when we think about development we have to ask certain questions:

- What do we want?
- What resources have we got with which to achieve our goals?
- What effect will development have? Will it benefit everyone or only a few?

I also said that Mafia is not without resources:

- its people and their local knowledge and intelligence
- a well organised local administration
- land much of which is fertile
- sea

With some small changes we could see great improvements. Here are some suggestions:

i) Improve Food Production

If most people could grow enough food to feed themselves, they could spend their cash income on other things: better clothes, education, consumer goods like radios and bicycles. How do we achieve this?

- Those who are not contributing much agricultural labour now could do so.
- Improved agricultural techniques should be taught to all farmers, including women who are responsible for most of the food production.
- Grow more vegetables and a wider variety of them. This is already beginning to happen and this is the first trip in which I have seen tomatoes available and plentiful. Some people also grow ladies fingers. But there is scarcely any vegetable which does not grow easily on Mafia with proper care, including green leafy vegetables which are an important source of iron.
- Keep poultry which provides eggs for children.

ii) Improve Technology

Appropriate intermediate technology could improve agriculture efficiency and lessen work loads:

Hand mills could husk rice.

- Ox-carts, wheelbarrows, water carts, could be used for carrying goods and water.
- Improved tools such as sickles for harvesting instead of shells
- Improved storage so that less of the grain is lost
- Greater yields could mean that some of the crop is set aside as a reserve
- More use of millet as a crop. This used to be the staple in the north of the island, but it is hardly grown now. it is a hardy crop, and very nutritious, more so than cassava and also a better food than unga ya dona.

iii) Improve Animal Husbandry

This could mean more meat and milk, more animals for ploughing and traction (eg carts), more dung for fertilizer. It might even be possible to think of generating biogas which could be
used for lighting. This could be done through a revival of the ‘better cattle’ (ng'ombe bora) scheme, and more help for farmers with medicine for dipping. This should lead to greater milk
yield, thus making milk available to everyone at a reasonable price. Greater use should also be made of goats for milk and meat. Goats are hardy animals which can eat almost anything, require little care, and produce milk which is more suitable for children than cows milk.

iv) Improve Cash Crops

I am told that there are many ways in which the coconut yield could be improved here and also land on which coconuts are grown could be used more intensively. Inter-planting of coconut treess with other crops like cocoa, peppers, papaya, bananas and vegetables would mean greater overall yields per acre.

v) Find Alternative Markets for Coconuts

At present the DSM markets are flooded with coconuts and the price has gone down. Alternative markets need to be sought. If Mafia Coconuts Ltd, now that it is under new management, takes off, it could not only process its own nuts but also buy nuts from small growers on the island, (as used to happen in the past), and process them for coconut oil, cattle feed, coir, charcoal and many other products.

vi) Investigate new sources of cash income

- -seaweed farming
- poultry production (which would also improve diet)
- beekeeping (which also improves pollination of coconuts)

vii) Fishing

More intensive fishing while also preserving fish stocks. Loans for fishermen wishing to purchase capital equipment such as boats or nets. This could give both cash income and also improve protein intake.

viii) Forming cooperatives in each village for mat production.

This would help in the cost of buying dyes, which is now considerable, and also in marketing. Consideration might be given to marketing directly through an NGO such as Oxfam, which would give producers a much better price.

ix) Establishing creches in each village

Creches are needed to care for children aged between two and seven, when they go to primary school. At present, such children are either left alone for long periods during the day, or mothers have to take them to the fields. Often such children are not fed from early morning until evening. A creche would not only mean that some adults, both older people and younger unmarried people keep an eye on them, it could also ensure that they get fed, thus improving their health.

In order to achieve all or any of the above, there are however, two important capital investments which have to be made. One is to improve communications both on the island via roads, the other with the mainland via the steamer. The first of these I am told I finally going to happen this year. The second is also possible, given that it used to run.

These are only suggestions - some may be possible, some may not. But if we could improve the food of each person, we could improve their health, their resistance to disease, and the quality of their lives. If we could improve cash incomes, we would enable people to have more goods, better clothes and houses. In short a better life.

I thank you for your patience and listening to me for so long.

Source: http://mafia-island-tanzania.gold.ac.uk/economy/the-meaning-of-development.pdf